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Abstract—Contact tracing promises to help fight the diffusion
of COVID-19 via an early detection of possible sources of further
contagion. A number of applications have been proposed to this
aim. All of them have in common the underlying architecture:
smartphones transmit their own beacons, while at the same time
storing the beacons sent by other devices—with a reconciliation
procedure being later applied. On top of this, solutions are
adopted to provide some privacy guarantees to the users. In this
paper, we relax the smartphone-centric assumption, and propose
an IoT-enabled architecture for contact tracing that enjoys the
following features: i) it reduces the overhead on the end-user
to the bare minimum—it requires the mobile phone to only
broadcast its beacons; ii) it provides the user with a degree of
privacy not achieved by competing solutions—even in the most
privacy adverse scenario, the solution provides k-anonymity; and,
iii) it is tunable: the very same architecture can be configured to
support several models, ranging from the fully decentralized to
the fully centralized ones. Finally, we also highlight open issues
and future directions. We believe that the novelty of the proposal,
as well as its striking properties and flexibility, has the potential
to pave the way for further research.
I. INTRODUCTION
One thing is clear about the COVID-19 pandemic declared
in March 2020: unless a vaccine is released, the fight against
the virus could last for years. Further, the initial battles
gained against the virus, such as a decrease in the number
of contagion in the USA (passed from a peak of 38, 509 in
April to a low of 31, 967 in May) [1], have been later lost,
with a record peak of contagion of 66, 281 new cases per day
in the first weeks of July 2020 [2].
The initial, dramatic spread of COVID-19 has seen several
responses put in place to slow down the pandemic—“flatten
the curve” being the objectives of states and international
organizations [3]. To this aim, contact tracing has been one of
the technology-provided tools to flatten the curve. The general
framework is quite intuitive: keeping track of the people she
gets in contact with. If one of the contacts later on tests positive
to the infectious disease, and the contact with such a positive
has been sustained for at least a given time (this is usually
referred to as possible contagion event), then chances are that
she could have been infected too. When exposed to a possible
contagion event, the user is typically subject to a clinical test
to confirm whether positive and, as a precautionary measure,
not to possibly propagate further the infection, the subject
adopts/is-required-to self-quarantine. The most widespread
technology to enable contact tracing is to resort to the user’s
mobile phone sending pseudo-random (unique) beacons via
the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) interface, while at the same
time recording the beacons sent by other users in the BLE
transmission range. In some solutions like Ehteraz [4] and
Hamagen [5], the BLE is also complemented with localiza-
tion information provided by the Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) [6].
A watershed difference in contact tracing applications is
in how reconciliation is achieved, that is, where the cross-
check among the list of beacons is performed to discover
possible contagion events, and how users subject to a possible
contagion event are notified. As per reconciliation, to one
extreme of the spectrum centralized solutions require all the
beacons generated by a user being transmitted to a central
server that will resolve the reconciliation, notifying the single
users to take precautionary measures since they have been
exposed to a possible contagion event. To the other extreme
we have decentralized solutions, where the involvement of a
central authority is reduced to the bare minimum, typically the
certification of testing positive to the disease, and the diffusion
of the beacons of the positively-tested users—to allow other
users in the system to independently check their level of
exposure.
What the above described seems quite linear and reasonable.
However, the way this general framework has been imple-
mented opens up some concerns about the usability of the
solution, as well as the pandora vase of privacy and security
issues. The cited dimensions, other than being critical on their
own, could also thwart the widespread adoption of contact
tracing, making it irrelevant in fighting the pandemic. Indeed,
to be effective requires an adoption rate of at least 60% of the
concerned population [7].
As per usability, the main challenge is related to the
energy efficiency of the devised solution. In fact, all available
contact tracing applications have been designed to run on
users’ smartphones. Signaling one’s presence is realized using
pseudo-random beacons spread via Bluetooth while keeping
track of the experienced contacts is realized via receiving
and storing someone else’s spread beacons. This implies an
energetic cost that, though the BLE protocol is used, cannot
be neglected. A further cost is the required storage. As a matter
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2of fact, while the beacons to be sent could be generated by
a seed—hence having a seed enables a user to regenerate the
sequence of spread beacons—the received beacons need to be
individually stored. Between the two constraints, given the
storage capability of smartphones and the actual size of a
beacon (64-128 bits), the most relevant issue is the one related
to energy consumption.
When it comes to privacy and security, the scientific com-
munity has started debating the issue from the very beginning,
with some notable works [8] being issued. The most recurrent
threats are user de-identification and user tracking. In particu-
lar, the possibility for an eavesdropper to be able to identify a
user as positive to the disease by combining the information
publicly released by competent authorities with the beacons
he could have acquired is a violation of the GDPR in the EU,
and in any case, a serious threat that could hinder the adoption
of the contact tracing application.
Contributions. In this paper, we present IoTrace, a solution
that relies on a distributed, flexible, and lightweight IoT-based
infrastructure that requires minimal overhead on the user’s
phone, while providing strong privacy guarantees, not provided
by competing proposals. IoTrace relaxes the requirement for
smartphones to receive the beacons issued by other devices
in their receiving range, as well as to store any beacon. This
translates in considerable savings from the energy and storage
point of view. Further advantages are that the IoT infrastructure
is fully distributed, heterogeneous, and pervasive. Distribution
and heterogeneity do help security [9], while pervasiveness
would allow assuring efficient contact tracing. Finally, the
reconciliation mechanism is fully tunable and could range
from a complete decentralized solution to a centralized one. It
is worth noting that the proposed solution would work for any
type of human2human transmissible disease—just tailoring the
application parameters, such as the time of exposure needed
to trigger the precautionary measures.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II introduces the threat model considered in this
work. Section III reviews some related work on contact tracing
protocols. Section IV presents the details of our solution with
the extensions. Section V and Section VI highlight security
and privacy challenges, countermeasures and future directions.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
In this work, we consider a powerful eavesdropping adver-
sary that is capable of collecting all beacons transmitted by
the users. The adversary is equipped with a powerful antenna,
which can be either a regular Bluetooth handheld device or
a Software Defined Radio (SDR) that is operated through a
laptop/smartphone running an SDR-compatible software tool.
Additionally, the attacker tags every beacon with a timestamp
and the geographic location where it was recorded. As a result,
the adversary has a global view of all communications and is
able to pinpoint every beacon to a unique spatiotemporal point,
although, the beacon can not be linked to a specific user. We
also consider a more involved eavesdropping adversary that is
able to get close to a target victim, in order to record beacons
that belong to the victim with a very high probability (i.e.,
there are no other devices in the vicinity, or the adversary uses
a directional antenna). Such an adversary is only interested
in identifying beacons that are associated with one or more
unique individuals.
Finally, we embrace a standard assumption in the literature:
the adversary runs in polynomial time and is unable to break
the cryptographic protocols that generate the pseudo-random
beacons. Based on the aforementioned adversarial model, we
consider two types of privacy attacks against the contact
tracing system:
• Location privacy attack: In this attack, the adversary’s
objective is to track the movements of one or more users
through the collected beacons.
• Health status privacy attack: Here, the objective is to
correctly infer whether one or more known users have
contracted the COVID-19 virus.
III. RELATED WORK
Several contact tracing applications have been developed in
the last few months. In the following paragraphs, we provide
a brief introduction of the state-of-the-art approaches and also
present a qualitative comparison in terms of user privacy.
BlueTrace [10]. BlueTrace is an open-source protocol that
formed the basis of Singapore’s TraceTogether app. It adopts
the BLE technology with an emphasis on energy consumption.
When two devices are in proximity, they exchange their
ephemeral IDs (i.e., beacons) and log this encounter in their
history logs. When a user is diagnosed as positive, his/her
history logs are sent to a central authority, using a secure con-
nection. Even though BlueTrace leverages the decentralized
architecture, the ephemeral IDs are generated by the central
authority and distributed to the individual devices. The main
cryptographic primitive involved in the computation of the
ephemeral IDs is AES-256-GCM.
DP-3T [11]. A large consortium of European researchers,
comprising numerous universities and institutions, proposed
the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing pro-
tocol that leverages the BLE technology to track and log
encounters with other users. The contact logs are never trans-
mitted to a central authority but are stored only on the client’s
device. When a user tests positive, his/her ephemeral IDs are
transmitted to the central authority. The IDs are generated with
symmetric key protocols, such as HMAC-SHA-256 and AES-
128-CTR. Finally, the project is completely open-source.
Apple/Google [12]. Similar to DP-3T, Apple and Google
agreed on a decentralized protocol for contact tracing, based
on BLE technology. In addition, they released the exposure
notification API as open-source to allow public health author-
ities to develop their own mobile applications. The contact
tracing logs do not contain any personal information and
ephemeral IDs are only stored on the user’s device. From the
cryptographic perspective, they adopt HMAC-SHA-256 and
AES-128.
Hamagen [5]. Hamagen was developed by Israel’s Ministry
of Health to monitor the COVID-19 pandemic. It allows for the
identification of diagnosed patients and people who came in
3Table I
COMPARISON OF STATE-OF-THE-ART REPRESENTATIVE SOLUTIONS. NONE: −, LOW: ?, MEDIUM: ??, HIGH: ???. FOR IOTRACE, SOME METRICS
INCLUDE TWO RATINGS THAT CORRESPOND TO THE BASIC: N AND PRIVACY-ENHANCED:  VERSIONS.
Features BlueTrace [10] DP-3T [11] Apple/Google [12] Hamagen [5] PEPP-PT [13] IoTrace
Wireless Technology Bluetooth Bluetooth Bluetooth GPS Bluetooth Bluetooth
Open-Source Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Architecture (C/D) D D D D C C N D 
Energy Consumption ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ? ??
Security Level (Crypto) ??? ??? ??? N/A ??? ???
Health Status Privacy ? − − ? − ?? ???
Location Privacy (w.r.t Positive) − − − − − − ???
Location Privacy (w.r.t Negative) ??? ??? ??? ??? − ???
Device Storage Requirements ?? ?? ?? ?? − ?
Computational Requirements ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ??
contact with them. Hamagen continuously monitors and logs
the user’s GPS coordinates on the device (no interaction with
other devices). After a user tests positive, and if he/she gives
prior consent, their location data is transmitted to the Ministry
of Health. All devices periodically download the up-to-date
location data and compare them against their own GPS history
logs. The application is released as open-source.
PEPP-PT [13]. The Pan-European Privacy-Preserving
Proximity Tracing protocol uses BLE to discover and store
locally the ephemeral IDs of devices that are in proximity.
It adopts a centralized architecture by employing a server to
collect and process contact logs and to also notify users of
potential contacts with an infected patient. The main crypto-
graphic algorithm they employ is AES. This approach also
adopts the open-source paradigm.
Table I presents a qualitative comparison of these state-of-
the-art protocols for a variety of metrics, such as privacy and
operational cost. First, we want to emphasize that a centralized
solution, such as PEPP-PT, can theoretically offer perfect
privacy guarantees. However, in reality, a central authority that
stores detailed contact logs from all users is an obvious target
for rogue insiders and malicious hackers. More importantly,
these logs may reveal a lot of sensitive information, beyond
the privacy attacks discussed under our threat model. As a
result, we do not consider centralized solutions as privacy-
preserving.
In terms of health status privacy, all decentralized protocols
fail to protect the identity of the infected users. Specifically,
DP-3T and Apple/Google disclose all the ephemeral IDs that
belong to the infected users, which allows an adversary to
infer with certainty whether a known ID (i.e., person) has
contracted the virus. On the other hand, BlueTrace only reveals
the user’s contact logs and is, thus, more privacy-preserving.
However, the ephemeral ID of the infected individual might
be inferred from its absence within a cluster of IDs with the
same time/location tags. Hamagen is a GPS-based solution, so
it reveals the infected user’s entire location history. While the
identity of the user may not be immediately clear, background
knowledge can be applied to link the published trajectories to
a specific individual.
In terms of location privacy, the decentralized protocols
offer excellent privacy to the users who never test positive
for the coronavirus. This is due to the unidirectional flow
of information, i.e., the devices only download data from the
central authority’s server without ever uploading any data of
their own. However, a user who tests positive has to publish
some relevant information to the central server. Usually, the
cited disclosure involves publishing ephemeral IDs, contact
logs, or GPS coordinates, unfortunately leading, among others,
to a complete compromise of the geographic locations that the
infected user has visited in the near past.
IV. EDGE CONTACT TRACING WITH IOT DEVICES
The novelty of IoTrace lies in the deployment of IoT
devices that support the contact tracing tasks at the network’s
edge complementing the individual mobile devices. The direct
benefits are: i) better user privacy; and, ii) reduced storage,
energy, and computational requirements on behalf of the
mobile devices. In what follows, Section IV-A introduces the
IoTrace architecture, and Section IV-B describes the contact
tracing protocol and the corresponding message flow in the
context of centralized architecture. Section IV-C discusses an
alternative fully distributed approach that also provides a high
level of privacy with the use of public-key cryptography.
A. System Architecture
The entities involved in the IoTrace architecture are the
following:
• User. A user carrying a smartphone device that runs
our contact tracing app. The app simply transmits BLE
beacons (pseudo-random ephemeral IDs) that are received
by the deployed IoT devices. The transmitted beacons are
also stored locally on the device for verifying proximity
to other users. Unlike existing approaches, the app only
operates in transmit-mode, i.e., it does not collect BLE
beacons from other devices.
• Totem. This is an IoT smart device, equipped with a BLE
transceiver that collects the beacons transmitted from the
users’ devices—in the paper, we represent it with the
Bluetooth symbol. We also assume that a totem maintains
a secure intranet connection to the central authority,
where it forwards all the received beacons—in a fashion
that could span from batch mode to real-time. In our
terminology, we call these beacons negative, i.e., they
belong to users who have not tested positive. From a
practical perspective, a totem could be a simple low-end
device, like a Raspberry Pi.
4• Hospital. This is a medical center that tests users who
may possibly have a COVID-19 infection. If a user tests
positive, the health professionals are given permission
to access his/her mobile device and forward the stored
beacons to the central authority. We call these beacons
positive.
• Central authority. This is a trusted party, whose role is
to collect the positive and negative beacons sent by the
corresponding hospitals and totems. It is assumed to be
always online and ready to provide an updated list of
beacons that belong to users who had a close contact
with an infected user. In a real scenario, this role can be
played by the Ministry of Health.
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed architecture can be
adopted in open spaces like parks or in closed spaces like
shopping malls and offices.
B. Protocol Message Flow
IoTrace’s approach to contact tracing is depicted in Fig. 2
and consists of the following steps:
• Let us assume a generic time-slot ti . At the beginning
of the time-slot, the transmitting user Alice/Bob gener-
ates a pseudo-random BLE beacon, according to some
cryptographic primitive, such as a keyed hash function.
• After collecting all beacon(s) within time-slot ti , the totem
forwards them to the central authority. The authority
stores each beacon as a tuple <totem-ID, time-slot, bea-
con> on its long-term memory.
• Assume that Alice is diagnosed as positive at an autho-
rized hospital. An authorized health official will access
Alice’s mobile application to send her recent beacons
(e.g., from the last two weeks) to the central authority.
• Consider one of Alice’s positive beacons that was trans-
mitted at time-slot τ. The central authority will identify
all the negative beacons within time-slots τ ±  (at that
particular totem), where  is a time window that depends
on the broadcast frequency of the beacons. The list of all
negative and positive beacons is published online.
• Finally, Bob downloads from the central authority the list
published at the previous step and checks whether his own
beacons are in the list. If there is a match, and the match
is sustained for an amount of time sufficient to declare
a potential contagion risk (set by the health authorities),
Bob is notified by the app of this possibility.
The data flow that summarizes the operations described above
is depicted in Fig. 3.
Compared to previous approaches in the literature, this
basic version of IoTrace already provides better protection of
the users’ health status privacy, since both the positive and
negative beacons are disclosed by the central authority. As a
result, IoTrace provides k-anonymity [14] in terms of health
status privacy. That is, if k beacons are published on behalf
of a single totem, each beacon has a 1/k chance of being the
positive one. As per the location privacy guarantees, they are
identical to existing decentralized solutions, such as DP-3T
and Apple/Google. However, IoTrace has a clear advantage in
terms of operational cost for mobile devices.
(a) Open space: Park.
(b) Closed space: Shopping mall.
(c) Closed space: Office.
Figure 1. IoTrace in different environments. A totem is represented by the
Bluetooth icon.
C. A Privacy-Enhanced Solution
We will now show how we can significantly enhance
the achieved privacy of IoTrace, while leveraging the same
architecture. The first improvement is related to the centralized
storage of all beacons. To this end, IoTrace can operate in
a fully decentralized model, i.e., the totems will store the
received beacons locally, without sending them to the central
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Figure 3. Protocol data flow.
authority. When a user tests positive for COVID-19, the central
authority will forward the positive beacons to all totems and,
in turn, the totems will send back to the central authority
all negative beacons that fall within the predetermined time
window from a positive one. This approach maintains the same
privacy guarantees and operational costs for mobile devices
while removing the inherent risks of centralized storage.
Our second improvement comes with increased computa-
tional and power consumption costs for the mobile devices
but results in a contact tracing solution which is secure against
eavesdropping adversaries. The key observation is that the IoT
infrastructure is relatively static, so it is easy to store on each
mobile device the list of all totem IDs, along with their public-
key certificates. Then, instead of transmitting their beacons in
plaintext, the mobile devices will first Consequently, when
the positive/negative beacons are published by the central
authority, an eavesdropper cannot link them to a particular
totem and time-slot. This solution is the first in the literature to
offer very strong privacy guarantees in terms of both location
and health status.
Overall, this latter solution is very flexible, in that it
allows individual users to choose more privacy in exchange
for a higher cost on their smartphones. Users who prefer a
lightweight approach may transmit their beacons in plaintext,
while those who prioritize privacy may submit encrypted
beacons instead.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
Contact tracing is, in essence, a surveillance-type applica-
tion. As such, the security and privacy of the entire system
are of paramount importance. In the following sections, we
describe the challenges that must be addressed, in order to
make edge contact tracing a secure and privacy-preserving
solution.
A. Security Considerations
Totem Security. The most obvious concern with regards to
the security of the proposed architecture is the exposure of
the totems to physical attacks. Indeed, totems will be widely
deployed in areas where attackers can easily access their
hardware and read the contents of their memory and non-
volatile storage. As a result, no sensitive information, such
as user beacons or private keys, should be stored in plain-
text format. For instance, data at rest could be encrypted
with the public-key of the central authority. Furthermore,
the totem should utilize a secure enclave to perform the
necessary cryptographic operations, and all beacons (even
when encrypted, as suggested above) should be erased as soon
as they are sent to the trusted authority. For the case of the
fully distributed architecture where the data are stored locally
at the totems, additional measures should be implemented to
harden their security.
Replay and Relay Attacks. These are active attacks where
the adversary eavesdrops on the broadcast beacons and then
replays those beacons to many other (even far away) totems.
The objective of these attacks is to generate a large number
of false contacts such that, if one individual tests positive, the
disclosure of his/her beacons will trigger many false positive
alerts. Such attacks can be addressed in two different ways.
First, the beacon generation protocol may incorporate certain
cryptographic protocols to thwart replay attacks. Second, the
trusted authority can analyze the collected data and identify
fraudulent beacons, e.g., the same beacon appearing in two
distant locations in a not time-congruent manner.
Denial of Service Attacks. The fixed location of the
deployed totems makes them an easy target for DoS attacks.
For instance, the adversary may use directional antennas to
jam a specific totem or overwhelm it with a large number
of random beacons. To this end, we should investigate the
applicability of known anti-DoS and anti-jamming techniques
to the edge contact tracing use-case.
Data Breaches. The trusted authority is a major target for
sophisticated hackers that wish to steal the collected beacons.
This information is very valuable, as it can be used to disclose
sensitive information about the underlying users. For that
reason, the centralized server must implement the current
state-of-the-art security mechanisms at all levels (network,
application, operating system).
6B. Privacy Considerations
Linkage and Profiling. Contact tracing protocols and ap-
plications bring with them several privacy concerns. One of
the most important ones is the misuse of the collected data at
the trusted authority, under the centralized model (e.g., PEPP-
PT). Indeed, a malicious insider with access to all beacons,
locations, timestamps, and contact lists, can extract sensitive
information about the underlying individuals (such as locations
visited, routes, social contacts, etc.). Fortunately, our proposed
architecture makes such attacks less feasible, because users
do not submit their own contact lists. Instead, all the beacons
are aggregated at the distributed totems, which makes it much
harder for an adversary to track individuals. Still, an interesting
research direction would be to quantify the privacy leakage
under the centralized edge contact tracing architecture.
Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping is a passive attack that is
difficult to defend against. An adversary with the ability to
eavesdrop at a large scale can simply record most beacons that
are broadcast by the users. When the list of positive/negative
beacons is published, the adversary can identify all the lo-
cations that the infected user has visited. This is an attack
that none of the existing contact tracing protocols can defend
against. However, our proposal is able to thwart such an attack,
when the user employs the public-key of the totem to bootstrap
a secure channel with the totem itself—as described in Section
IV-C.
Path Disclosure. Totems are located at fixed geographic
locations, so a beacon that is stored in a series of totems will
disclose this partial path to an adversary. Therefore, to preserve
path privacy, beacons should change very frequently (to an
extreme, every beacon should be transmitted exactly one time),
or beacons should be encrypted, as in Section IV-C.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the proposed architecture, an IoT device (totem) is
configured as the edge component between the device and
the hospital/authority. Hence, a research direction relevant to
our solution, but also of general interest for the IoT domain,
arises from the need to reduce the required computations, for
instance adopting lightweight cryptographic primitives needed
to meet the intended security and privacy goals.
A further possible research direction, peculiar to the tracing
protocols, would be to design secure two-party protocols
(between the trusted authority and a user) that allow users to
blindly match their beacons against the server’s beacon list—
removing the need to publish any type of beacon.
Also, Artificial Intelligence and machine/deep learning al-
gorithms deployed on the edge component could be leveraged
to optimize the localization accuracy for the Bluetooth tech-
nology.
Finally, though BLE has been the choice of election by both
the scientific and the industrial community, we believe that
more research on different communication technologies would
be needed. In particular, Ultra-wideband (UWB) carriers as
well as acoustic channels [15] could be used to improve
accuracy, privacy, and reliability of contact tracing solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided several contributions: we
highlighted the main features of the most relevant solutions
for contact tracing, shading lights on their relationship with
computational requirements, security, and privacy levels. In
particular, we have reported a clear unbalance when it comes
to the privacy guarantees provided to the different categories
of users. Hence, we have proposed IoTrace, a novel IoT-based
architecture for contact tracing, that addresses some of the
major issues above reported: it provides a balance between the
level of privacy of the different user categories; it reduces the
overhead on the end-user device; it enhances location privacy;
and, it is scalable and flexible—allowing to accommodate
different contact tracing models, from the purely decentralized
to the centralized one. Finally, we have also highlighted some
future research directions.
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